Since the work of John von Neumann, "games" have been a scientific metaphor for a much wider range of human interactions in which the outcomes depend on the interactive strategies of two or more persons, who have opposed or at best mixed motives. Among the issues discussed in game theory are
1) What does it mean to choose strategies "rationally" when outcomes depend on the strategies chosen by others and when information is incomplete?
2) In "games" that allow mutual gain (or mutual loss) is it "rational" to cooperate to realize the mutual gain (or avoid the mutual loss) or is it "rational" to act aggressively in seeking individual gain regardless of mutual gain or loss?
3) If the answers to 2) are "sometimes," in what circumstances is aggression rational and in what circumstances is cooperation rational?
4) In particular, do ongoing relationships differ from one-off encounters in this connection?
5) Can moral rules of cooperation emerge spontaneously from the interactions of rational egoists?
6) How does real human behavior correspond to "rational" behavior in these cases?
7) If it differs, in what direction? Are people more cooperative than would be "rational?" More aggressive? Both?
Thus, among the "games" studied by game theory are
(This list is extracted from an index of games discussed in Roy Gardner, Games for Business and Economics)
The key link between neoclassical economics and game theory was and is rationality. Neoclassical economics is based on the assumption that human beings are absolutely rational in their economic choices. Specifically, the assumption is that each person maximizes her or his rewards -- profits, incomes, or subjective benefits -- in the circumstances that she or he faces. This hypothesis serves a double purpose in the study of the allocation of resources. First, it narrows the range of possibilities somewhat. Absolutely rational behavior is more predictable than irrational behavior. Second, it provides a criterion for evaluation of the efficiency of an economic system. If the system leads to a reduction in the rewards coming to some people, without producing more than compensating rewards to others (costs greater than benefits, broadly) then something is wrong. Pollution, the overexploitation of fisheries, and inadequate resources committed to research can all be examples of this.
In neoclassical economics, the rational individual faces a specific system of institutions, including property rights, money, and highly competitive markets. These are among the "circumstances" that the person takes into account in maximizing rewards. The implications of property rights, a money economy and ideally competitive markets is that the individual needs not consider her or his interactions with other individuals. She or he needs consider only his or her own situation and the "conditions of the market." But this leads to two problems. First, it limits the range of the theory. Where-ever competition is restricted (but there is no monopoly), or property rights are not fully defined, consensus neoclassical economic theory is inapplicable, and neoclassical economics has never produced a generally accepted extension of the theory to cover these cases. Decisions taken outside the money economy were also problematic for neoclassical economics.
Game theory was intended to confront just this problem: to provide a theory of economic and strategic behavior when people interact directly, rather than "through the market." In game theory, "games" have always been a metaphor for more serious interactions in human society. Game theory may be about poker and baseball, but it is not about chess, and it is about such serious interactions as market competition, arms races and environmental pollution. But game theory addresses the serious interactions using the metaphor of a game: in these serious interactions, as in games, the individual's choice is essentially a choice of a strategy, and the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategies chosen by each of the participants. On this interpretation, a study of games may indeed tell us something about serious interactions. But how much?
In neoclassical economic theory, to choose rationally is to maximize one's rewards. From one point of view, this is a problem in mathematics: choose the activity that maximizes rewards in given circumstances. Thus we may think of rational economic choices as the "solution" to a problem of mathematics. In game theory, the case is more complex, since the outcome depends not only on my own strategies and the "market conditions," but also directly on the strategies chosen by others, but we may still think of the rational choice of strategies as a mathematical problem -- maximize the rewards of a group of interacting decision makers -- and so we again speak of the rational outcome as the "solution" to the game.
Roger A. McCain